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Awada v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57 (Dec. 27, 2007) 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – DISPOSAL OF CLAIMS
Summary
Appeal of a district court judgment in a contract action and a post-judgment order
denying a new trial.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings. District courts have the discretion to bifurcate the legal and equitable claims of a
single action, conduct a bench trial on the equitable claims, and, so long as it is done pursuant to
Nevada law and the rules of civil procedure, district courts may subsequently use the findings of
fact and conclusions of law from the bench trial to dispose of any remaining claims in the action.
Factual and Procedural History
In November 1999, after receiving approval from the Nevada Gaming Control Board,
Yehia Awada patented one of its card games titled 3 Way Action, for which he had previously
registered the 3 Way Action trademark. After unsuccessfully marketing the game on his own,
Awada entered into an agreement with Shuffle Master. Under the agreement, Awada became
Shuffle Master’s employee for six months and was responsible for promoting the game under
Shuffle Master’s direction. Awada “represented and warranted that he and GEI were the sole
owners of [the game] . . . and all intellectual property related thereto free and clear of any claims.
. .” 2
The agreement granted Shuffle Master “all of the rights including all intellectual property
rights,” 3 the control and exclusive right to promote and test-market the game during the six
month period, and the option to purchase an exclusive license for all rights to the game at a set
price.
Prior to entering into this agreement, Awada had entered into an agreement with
International Game Technology (hereinafter “IGT”) granting them the right to use the name and
trademark, 3 Way Action, for a video poker game. Thus, Shuffle Master was forced to enter into
a separate agreement with IGT in order to use the 3 Way Action name for the table game.
However, Shuffle Master was prevented from developing a video version of the game because
this would infringe on IGT’s trademark rights.
Shuffle Master did not exercise its option to purchase the exclusive license from Awada
in the agreed time period, and, after failing to resolve their differences; Shuffle Master rescinded
the agreement and ended its relationship with Awada.
In September 2002, Awada filed a complaint against Shuffle Master and its chief
executive officer “alleging breach of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with
contractual relations/prospective economic advantage, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unjust enrichment.” 4 In its answer, Shuffle Master
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asserted various affirmative defenses and counterclaims, and sought rescission of the agreement
based on fraudulent inducement and failure to perform.
Although the district court denied Shuffle Master’s initial motion for summary judgment,
it subsequently bifurcated Shuffle Master’s rescission request from the other claims and
conducted a bench trial on this counterclaim alone. After reviewing the evidence and testimony,
the district court ruled in favor of Shuffle Master and rescinded the agreement. The district court
then attempted to settle the remaining claims and requested that the parties submit “letter briefs”
addressing the impact of the findings and conclusions on the remaining claims.
During a status check, the district court told the parties that the findings and conclusions
from the bench trial disposed of the remaining claims. Thereafter, the court entered an order
dismissing Awada’s remaining claims with prejudice. The district court subsequently denied
Awada’s motion to amend its findings and conclusions and its motion for a new trial.
In the present action, Awada appeals the rescission order, the dismissal of his claims, and
the denial of his motion for a new trial. Awada argues that the district court violated his right to
a jury trial when it bifurcated the claims, conducted a bench trial on only one claim, and used the
findings and conclusions to dispose of the remaining claims.
Discussion
Awada’s Request for A Jury Trial
A district court has the discretion to separate “any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim” and conduct a separate trial as long as it “always preserv[es] inviolate the
[constitutional] right of trial by jury.” 5 Because the right to a jury trial does not extend to
equitable matters, 6 the Court had to determine whether this right was preserved when a court,
after first considering the equitable claims, uses its conclusions of those claims to dispose of a
case’s legal issues before proceeding to a jury trial.
The court reviewed the constitutional issue of the right to a jury trial de novo. 7 The
Nevada Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by Jury shall be secured to all and remain
inviolate forever.” 8 The Nevada jury trial right is defined by English common law because the
phrasing indicates the framer’s intent regarding the right as they understood it at the time of the
adoption of the Nevada Constitution, in 1864. 9 In order to examine the jury trial right in light of
the English common law at the time in this country, the court examined the existent law of 1864,
in California. In California, courts had the discretion to resolve equitable issues in a case before
addressing the legal issues. 10 Furthermore, one case recognized that resolving the equitable
issues “[would] obviate the necessity of a trial of the legal issues.” 11 Additionally, the court
5
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surveyed the law in existence, in 1864, in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio, which recognized that the
inviolate jury right did not prevent a court from addressing a case’s equitable claims first, 12 even
if their resolution disposed of the case at law. 13
This sampling of cases illustrated that, as understood in 1864, the jury trial right did not
prevent a court from addressing a case’s equitable issues before presenting the legal issues to a
jury, if necessary. Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that “Nevada’s jury trial right . . .
does not require the district court always . . . proceed first with any legal issues.” 14 As such, in
this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it bifurcated the claims, conducted a
bench trial on the rescission issue alone, and then disposed of Awada’s contract-based claims
based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the bench trial. 15
Rescission
A contract may be rescinded based on fraud in the inducement. 16 Fraud in the
inducement must be proven by, among other things, showing that a party made a false
representation that was material to the transaction. 17 The district court found that Awada
misrepresented his ownership interests based on:
1. [T]he agreement, wherein Awada represented that he and GEI were
the sole owners of the game;
2. [A] copy of Awada’s agreement with IGT, wherein he granted to IGT
his rights to the name 3 Way Action before executing the agreement
with Shuffle Master;
3. [T]estimonial evidence supporting Shuffle Master’s claim; and
4. [E]vidence that after entering into the agreement, Shuffle Master had
to negotiate a separate agreement with IGT in order to use the name 3
Way Action.
Awada, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57, p. 14. The Supreme Court concluded that this was
adequate evidence to support the district court’s finding of fraud in the inducement and, as such,
the district court acted within its discretion when it rescinded the contract. 18
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Contract-Based Claims
Awada argued the district erred when it dismissed his contract claims. However, the
basis for the contract-based claims was eliminated when the district court rescinded the contract
because “where there has been a valid rescission of the contract, there is no longer any contract
to enforce and, therefore, no longer a cause of action for breach.” 19 Therefore, because the
Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly rescinded the contract, it also concluded
that the district court properly disposed of the contract-based claims after it rescinded the
agreement.
Awada’s Remaining Claims
The Court concluded that the district improperly disposed of Awada’s remaining claims
against Shuffle Master and Yoseloff because these claims did not rely on the existence of a valid
contract. As such, these claims were not automatically eliminated when the contract was
rescinded. Thus, the Court concluded the district court erred when it dismissed these claims
“without giving Awada notice and an opportunity to be heard as required under NRCP 56.” 20
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that district courts have the discretion to bifurcate
the equitable and legal issues of an action, conduct a bench trial on the equitable issues, and
dispose of any remaining issues, “so long as disposal of the issues is available under Nevada
law.” 21 Thus, the district court acted within its discretion when it bifurcated the claims in this
case.
As such, the Court affirmed the district court’s rescission of the agreement because there
was substantial evidence supporting the district court’s findings. Furthermore, the district court
did not err when it disposed of Awada’s contract-based claims against Shuffle Master. However,
the Court reversed the district court’s judgment as to Awada’s remaining claims against Shuffle
Master and Yoseloff because the district court disposed of these “without conducting the second
portion of the bifurcated trial or adhering to the procedural requirements of NRCP 56.” 22
Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
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